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ABSTRACT
As the Internet struggles to cope with scalability, mobility, and
security issues, new network architectures are being proposed to
better accommodate the needs of modern systems and applications.
In particular, Content-Oriented Networking (CON) has emerged as
a promising next-generation Internet architecture: it sets to decou-
ple content from hosts, at the network layer, by naming data rather
than hosts. CON comes with a potential for a wide range of ben-
efits, including reduced congestion and improved delivery speed
by means of content caching, simpler configuration of network de-
vices, and security at the data level. However, it remains an interest-
ing open question whether or not, and to what extent, this emerging
networking paradigm bears new privacy challenges. In this paper,
we provide a systematic privacy analysis of CON and the common
building blocks among its various architectural instances in order
to highlight emerging privacy threats, and analyze a few potential
countermeasures. Finally, we present a comparison between CON
and today’s Internet in the context of a few privacy concepts, such
as, anonymity, censoring, traceability, and confidentiality.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, the increasing penetration of the Web in
our society has prompted a tremendous growth of data routed in
the Internet, to such an extent that global IP traffic– thrusted by the
soaring proliferation of mobile and streaming data – is expected
to increase 3-fold over the next 5 years [25]. Besides exceeding
its expectations, the Internet has also stretched many of the ini-
tial assumptions, creating issues that challenge its underlying com-
munication model. Applications increasingly operate in terms of
content, making it difficult to conform to IP’s requirement to com-
municate by discovering and specifying hosts and locations [56].
Coping with massive amounts of traffic becomes arduous due to
a number of issues deep-rooted in the network design. As a result,
the quest for improving scalability and (cost) efficiency of content
delivery has led to the design of overlay networks, such as, Peer-To-
Peer (P2P) and Content Distribution Networks (CDNs). However,
overlay networks often complicate network management and ap-
plication development. P2P reduces servers’ load by distributing
content among peers, using dynamic and fault-tolerant networks,
but it often results in an increased inter-provider traffic [69, 52].
Moreover, P2P is application-dependent, thus, confined to a spe-
cific usage. CDNs are used to convoy user’s requests to geographi-
cally closest caches in order to reduce traffic, however, they require
ad-hoc infrastructures and only some providers can afford the re-
lated deployment costs.
∗A preliminary version of this paper appears in the ACM SIGCOMM Com-
puter Communication Review (CCR), Vol. 43, Issue 3, July 2013. This is
the full version.
Further, endpoint authentication mechanisms (whereby an end-
point can only authenticate the counterpart, but not the message)
have been challenged by frequent attacks against SSL [34, 42] and
the hacking of certification authorities [46]. Also, the Internet today
often struggles with mobility and resilience to disruption. Trans-
port layer is, by design, unable to manage mobile parties and add-
on features – e.g., Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) and Hierarchical MIPv6
[19] – have been suggested, albeit suffering from handoff latency
and packet losses [26].
Motivated by these issues, new architectures have been pro-
posed, in the last few years, aiming to redesign the Internet
(see, e.g., NSF’s Future Internet Architecture multi-million pro-
gram [57]), and accommodate content-oriented applications. In
particular, Content-Oriented Networking (CON) [22] has set to
decouple contents from hosts, at the network layer, by relying on
the publish/subscribe paradigm. CON shifts identification from
host to content, so that this can be located anywhere in the net-
work. The content-centric communication paradigm introduced by
CON relies on naming the content itself, rather than its location,
and thus radically changes the way data is handled. Content is self-
contained, has a unique name, can be retrieved by means of an in-
terest for that name, cached in any arbitrary location, and digitally
signed to ensure its integrity and authenticity.
1.1 Roadmap & Contributions
CON comes with a potential for several advantages, including
reduced congestion and improved delivery speed through content
caching, simpler configuration of network devices, and security
at the data level. However, it remains an interesting open ques-
tion whether or not, and to what extent, this emerging network-
ing paradigm bears new privacy challenges. While some features,
such as, lack of source/destination addresses, might help privacy in
CON, a closer look to some of the design choices unveils a num-
ber of open questions. This paper systematicallystudies privacy in
CON as a generic paradigm and shows that it introduces several
worrisome issues.
First, we analyze the implications of caching – one of the cru-
cial features in CON used to reduce traffic and improve delivery
speed – on user privacy and show that, as nodes cache frequently
requested content, they can infer content consumed by others using
timing information. Next, we focus on content privacy: since pub-
licly available content is not encrypted in CON and, as routers now
handle content, any router can easily inspect content. Whereas,
packet inspection in today’s Internet requires routers to reassemble
packets, which is very inefficient as router primary job is to forward
packets, and often requires dedicated hardware [10].
Furthermore, as content in CON is retrieved using names that
most likely are semantically related to the content itself, an attacker
could infer sensitive information about a user, by monitoring her
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requests: we refer to this issue as name privacy. Finally, we look at
signature privacy: since digital signatures of CON packets need to
be publicly verifiable, the identity of a content signer may be easily
inferred by looking at the signature.
In this paper, we discuss different attack scenarios that threaten
privacy in CON. For each setting, we describe the attacker capabil-
ities and related impact on user privacy. We suggest several ideas
that could serve as countermeasures and detail their strengths and
weaknesses, and make sure that they would bear minimal changes
to the CON architecture. To the best of our knowledge, this rep-
resents the first step toward a thorough analysis of CON privacy
issues. In the process, we also highlight a number of challenging
open problems that call for further research.
Paper Organization. Next section presents an overview of
Content-Oriented Networking (CON). Then, we provide a thor-
ough analysis of a few privacy challenges in CON and detail pos-
sible countermeasures in Section 3. In Section 4, we compare the
feasibility and effectiveness of privacy-enhancing technologies in
CON as opposed to today’s Internet. Finally after summarizing re-
lated work in Section 5, the paper concludes in Section 6.
2. CONTENT-ORIENTED NETWORKING
This section provides a high-level description of Content-
Oriented Networking (CON). We present the main components
common to most of available CON architectures, along with their
respective design choices.
A few future Internet architectures have been proposed so far
that realize CON. The most prominent ones include DONA [47],
NetInf [5], CCN [45], LANES [71], TRIAD [43], CBCB [18]. We
now review their macrobuilding blocks:
1. Named content: In CON, objects are always named to facil-
itate data dissemination and search. Consequently, the secu-
rity model is also shifted from host to content authentication.
2. Content-based routing: Content routing in CON relies
on content rather than hosts, aiming to handle increased
amounts of network traffic and be more resilient to network
bursts and users’ mobility.
3. Content Delivery: Content is efficiently delivered using
multi-path routing and leveraging in-network caching, in or-
der to minimize network bandwidth and delivery delay, and
transparently handle mobile users.
4. In-network storage: All CON network components provide
caching capability. Note that this is different from packet
buffers in today’s routers, as cache size is expected to be sev-
eral orders of magnitude bigger in CON.
Network Model. CON involves several entities (see Fig. 1). End
users express interests and fetch data using a wide range of devices.
Interests represent the willingness of the user to retrieve certain
data, independently of its location. Content routers are responsible
of forwarding interests and forwarding back the associated data.
Each router is assumed to have a built-in cache. Cache size as well
as caching algorithm may differ from one router to the other. Fi-
nally, content producers (or publisher) generate the content—either
static (time-independent) or dynamic (generated upon request). Al-
though data-centers or/and geographically distributed servers may
be used to serve content, we simplify the model by considering a
single source machine.
In the following, we overview CON’s architecture design. For
further details, we refer the reader to [24, 3].

 
























Figure 1: An overview of the main CON features: content routing,
caching, and content signature. Content is address by name (x).
Caching. A key feature used to increase overall network efficiency
in CON is caching. All nodes in the network are expected to partic-
ipate in the caching effort, from core routers to mobile devices.
Caches provide in-network storage and are assumed to be sev-
eral orders of magnitude larger than today’s buffers. This capac-
ity allows to store content for longer periods and enhance network
performance. There is a number of efforts aiming at optimizing
caching strategies in CON – see, e.g., [6, 64, 68, 67]. In particu-
lar, [67] demonstrates that network topology has a limited effect in
caching efficiency, whereas, catalogue’s size (i.e., size of all con-
tent) and content popularity play a major role in caching efficiency.
[64] proposes a probabilistic caching algorithm, based on an ap-
proximation of the cache capacity, while [23] introduces a caching
approach that relies on the content popularity to decide whether to
cache the content or not.
Content Naming. The main abstraction in CON architecture is
the Content Object (CO). All kinds of content, ranging from web
pages to documents, and even interactive content, such as VoIP,
are abstracted as a CO. An object is always identified by a name,
which must be unique as it serves as identifier for searching and
disseminating associated content. Moreover, since content can be
fetched from anywhere, there should be a secure binding between
content name and content data (i.e., name-data integrity) as well
as object authenticity. Finally, objects retrieved from cache should
carry information about the object owner (publisher). Two naming
approaches have been proposed so far – flat and hierarchical.
Flat naming. Flat names are self-certifying, i.e., CO’s name-data
integrity is bounded to its name, thus, it can be verified without
any PKI. In its simplest form, the name is expressed as the cryp-
tographic hash function of the content. Although one can assess
the validity of the content, it is impossible to verify its provenance
and relevance. However, a few techniques have been proposed to
enable provenance verification, by allowing the publisher to have
more control on the naming by adding a label (e.g. [48, 47]). Un-
fortunately, these solutions do not guarantee binding between the
name and the content. Thus, we will assume the use of secure
binding, as proposed by [70], whereby content is made available
as a triple M(N,P,C) = (N,C, SignP (N,C)), where N is the
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content name, C the content, and SignP producer’s signature.
For instance, the naming mechanism can be instantiated as
Digest(PublicKeyp||Labelc) [48], where || denotes concate-
nation and PublicKeyp is the content producer public key, or
Digest(PublicKeyp)||Labelc, as it happens in DONA [47]. The
content is authenticated by checking whether or not it is verifiable
using PublicKeyp. Unfortunately, both solutions do not guarantee
binding between the name and the content.1 Moreover, as pointed
out by [70], flat naming suffers from several other disadvantages.
First, opaque names are location-free, thus, making it difficult to
build a routing mechanism to retrieve the nearest copy [17, 54].
Therefore, location-dependent approaches are often used, such as
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) [48, 65, 78]. Second, and most
importantly, it is well-known that users strive to remember sim-
ple strings like emails and hostnames [2, 39, 4], thus, indirection
architectures [2, 8] become necessary. This is somewhat similar
to the Domain Name System (DNS) service (used today to map
user-friendly names to network names), and, unfortunately, shifts
security/privacy problems, once again, from the content name to
the mapping architecture.
Hierarchical naming. With hierarchical naming, name struc-
ture resembles that of today’s URLs, where the ’/’ symbol de-
limits the name components. In some cases (e.g., CCN [45] and
TRIAD [43]), the name is human-readable, which makes it easier
for the user to access the content. The major benefit of adopting
a hierarchical structure is to enable aggregation, thus, improving
routing scalability. Note that, similar to flat naming, we assume the
use of secure binding, as proposed by [70].
Nonetheless, hierarchical naming has at least three drawbacks.
First, names are not persistent: any changes in the hierarchy alter
the content name and hence make the content unreachable. Second,
since names are semantically meaningful, it might leak sensitive
information about the content and hence may be considered as a
privacy threat (which we further explore in Section 3.4). Finally,
a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) is needed to verify name-data
integrity, potentially impacting the scalability and the security of
the architecture.
Content Routing and Forwarding. As illustrated in Fig. 1, rout-
ing in CON is performed in two phases: (1) routing of CO requests
(“interests”), and (2) routing the content back to the user. Naturally,
this depends on the naming schema and, in particular, on whether
or not name aggregation is possible. For flat-naming based CON, a
Name Resolution Service (NRS) is used to retrieve topological in-
formation (such as, the data location) based on object name. Struc-
tured routing algorithms are often used to exploit structured net-
work topologies, such as trees or DHT-s. For example, DONA [47]
maintains a tree topology and lets each router store routing infor-
mation of all his descendants. Thus, any content (re)publication,
deletion, or modification is propagated up to the root. With hier-
archical naming, efficient routing and discovery is possible with-
out any external service. Request/data aggregation may also facili-
tate network scalability. This approach may resemble unstructured
routing in IP, where IP addresses are replaced with content name
and route advertising is achieved through flooding.
CCN/CCNx overview. To ease presentation, in the rest of the
paper, we will refer to technical details of one specific CON in-
stance, namely, CCNx [60], the open-source project that imple-
ments Content-Centric Networking (CCN) [45]. CCNx is consid-
1We will assume the use of secure binding, as proposed by [70], whereby content is
made available as a triple M(N,P,C) = (N,C, SignP (N,C)), where N is the
content name, C the content, and SignP producer’s signature.
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
Figure 2: Topology of cache attacks.
ered one of the most mature examples of CON in the research com-
munity, with multiple platform implementations, documentations,
and implementations, supported by a relatively large community.
In CCNx, whenever a router receives an interest for name X ,
it performs a longest prefix match lookup on its three main tables
as follow: First, it looks whether the interest exits in the Content
Store (i.e., the main cache): if so, a copy is forwarded back to
the user and the routing process terminates. Otherwise, a lookup
is launched on the Pending Interest Table (PIT). This table keeps
track of all interests waiting to be resolved by upstream nodes. If
there is a match, the router collapses the present interest (and any
subsequent ones for X) storing only the interface on which it was
received. Finally, if no match is found, the router searches for the
most suitable interface in his Forward Information Base (FIB) to
forward the interest and then creates a PIT entry for that interest.
3. PRIVACY CHALLENGES IN CON
We now present a systematic analysis of privacy in Content-
Oriented Networking (CON) by identifying threats and, when pos-
sible, discussing possible solutions. Multiple proposals [47, 5, 45,
71, 43, 18] have been presented in the last couple of years to instan-
tiate CON, with relatively minor differences in their proposed de-
sign. As mentioned above, we will discuss technical details while
considering the CCNx instance [60], however, threats and proposed
countermeasures discussed in this paper apply to CON in general.
That is, issues are about fundamental features in CON (such as,
caching, naming, data delivery and provenance assurance) and not
about the specifics of one implementation.
3.1 Cache privacy
We start our analysis with cache privacy. Recall that caching is
a fundamental component of CON as it benefits both latency and
bandwidth consumption. However, it also introduces a fundamen-
tal challenge to user privacy. An adversary may use a router’s cache
to infer content exchanged (consumed) by users in the downstream
and possibly link it to a specific user depending on its relative lo-
cation to the user in the topology. Cache attacks in CON are exem-
plified in Fig. 2. There are different types of attacks that can occur
on cache privacy – we review them below.
Timing attacks. By measuring time [37], an adversary Adv can
determine if a content has been cached at a particular router by
measuring the delay to retrieve it. To do so, Adv measures the
RTTs to retrieve any content from the source, the delay RTTc to
get cached content from the closest router, and the delay RTTt to
fetch targeted content. Then, Adv compares the RTT as follow:
• If |RTTt − RTTc| <  (for negligible ): Adv concludes
that target content has been cached at the closest router (i.e.,
has been fetched by a neighboring consumer connected to
the same router).
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• If RTTt > RTTc and RTTt < RTTs: Adv knows that
target content has been fetched from the source recently and
cached in the network, but not by one of its immediate neigh-
bors. Based on the difference between RTTt and RTTc,
Adv can still predict how close the consumer of that content
was to his location in the network topology.
• Otherwise (|RTTt−RTTs| < ),Adv concludes that target
content has not been consumed recently.
Such an attack allows Adv to check whether or not content has
been recently fetched, but not when. Launiger et al. [50] describe
the timing attacks in the context of CON, and show that the cache
replacement policy has only a small impact on the attacks’ suc-
cess. Finally, observe that, since in-network caches are shared by
all CON designs, this attack is inherent to all CON proposed archi-
tectures.
Protocol attacks. Without a careful design, content retrieval pro-
tocols and their features in CON architectures can make access
to cache content even easier. After investigating such issues in
CCNx [60], we found out that a number of features and options
in interest packets [59], and how they are matched with content
packets, are particularly worrisome:
• Prefix-based matching: CCNx considers a content with name
X to satisfy an interest for name Y if Y is a proper prefix
of X . This can facilitate easy extraction of cache content
without knowing exact names. Due to multiple types of con-
tent potentially satisfying an interest, an exclusion option is
also conveniently provided in CCNx interest packet format
to allow exclusion of previously acquired content from sub-
sequent queries.
• Scoping: In CCNx, scope for interest packets is used to de-
termine the maximum number of hops it will travel. Such a
feature makes it easy to query the caches of particular routers
as it controls where (i.e., how many hops away) an inter-
est packet can travel to. For instance, setting the scope to
2 would restrict an interest to propagate to only neighbour-
ing router(s) and allow convenient querying of their caches
without relying on any timing information.
As a result, Adv can monitor the access to sensitive content within
a certain scope or easily dump nearby caches’ content. The former
attack is achieved by periodically issuing an interest Im for target
content m and setting the scope accordingly (e.g., setting scope
to 2 to monitor the caches of immediate neighbors). If Im times
out, Adv concludes that m has not been fetched yet. Whenever a
consumer within the scope accessesm, Im is satisfied, thus, allow-
ing Adv to be notified. Hence, Adv is able to infer when the file
was fetched for the first time. Dumping attacks can be achieved by
sending an interest for the root prefix / or short prefixes, repeat-
edly, and excluding what has been already received on successive
interests. Combined with scoping, this method can easily be used
to dump cache contents from nearby caches.
We believe that the above attacks are quite worrying, however,
observe that the attack success depends on the relative location of
the adversary to the victim in the network topology. Thus, we dis-
tinguish two classes of adversaries:
• Immediate Neighbor: if an attacker is sharing the first hop
CON router with his potential victim, the privacy risk is max-
imized as it would not only be easy to singularly monitor
or dump a close-by router, but also victim’s anonymity set
would be very small, due to the limited number of users shar-
ing that router.
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Figure 3: Collaborative caching
• Distant Neighbor: Considering the tree-like topology in con-
tent distribution from its original source to its consumers
(where the source is the root, consumers are the leaves, and
the intermediate routers are nodes in between), the path from
an adversary and a consumer to the root will intersect at least
one node. Therefore, the privacy risk decreases as the num-
ber of leaves in the sub-tree rooted at that node increases (i.e.,
anonymity set gets larger).
Potential Solutions
Different algorithms have been proposed to enhance the hit ra-
tio [6, 64, 68, 67] on caches, however, none of them takes into
consideration potential related privacy issues. In the following, we
discuss some potential countermeasures to mitigate such privacy
threats at a high level. Although the detailed design and security
analysis for these methods are not within the scope of this paper,
we expect the research community to further investigate them in
future work.
Wait before reply. A simple solution to the cache privacy problem
is to delay all requests: when the router fetches contentm, it should
store the corresponding RTT tm. Then, whenever a user requests
m, the router waits tm before sending the data back. Note that,
independently from our work, Acs et al. have recently proposed
a similar solution [1]. Wait before reply has three main advan-
tages: (1) it provably achieves perfect privacy since Adv cannot
distinguish between cached and not cached data [1]; (2) it does not
make any assumptions about content correlation, network topol-
ogy, or consumers, and (3) it achieves reduced bandwidth thanks
to caching. Unfortunately, however, this approach has the main
drawback of eliminating the positive effect of caching on content
retrieval delay.
Delay the first k. An alternative to the above solution is to delay
the first k requests for contentm to ensure that only popular content
is cached on edge routers serving small number of customers, sim-
ilar to what Acs et al. have recently (and independently from our
work) proposed in [1]. Note that k should be chosen randomly by
routers, otherwise an adversary could break this schema by issuing
k requests and timing responses. The main advantage of this ap-
proach is that consumers accessing popular content are unlikely to
experience any delays introduced by routers. However, k should be
carefully and randomly chosen for each content. High values of k
result in delaying most of the requests, whereas, a small value will
have a negative impact on user’s privacy by reducing the anonymity
set. Furthermore, the delay on the retrieval of not so popular con-
tent will still be high. Finally, we note that Acs et al. [1] provide a
formal model that allows to quantify the tradeoff between privacy
offered by various caching algorithms and the latency.
Collaborative caching. Multiple nearby caches could collaborate
4
to create a distributed cache that is serving a bigger set of users.
Such an integration would create an illusion of a single cache of
bigger size and would also increase the anonymity set for cus-
tomers. Several algorithms have been proposed in this context [49,
73] and can be categorized as hierarchical or mesh based. The latter
refers to a flat structure while the former is used for caches that have
a tree-like structure. In a simple mesh scenario, two routersR1 and
R2 collaborate as follows: the hash universe (e.g., 256 bits) is di-
vided in two subspaces s1,s2 where R1 and R2 stores the elements
in s1 and s2 respectively. Based on computed hash (of the routable
prefix of the content name), the router decides whether to cache
that content or transmit it to his neighboring router. Similarly, in-
terests are first forwarded to the router responsible for caching the
corresponding subspace(see Fig. 3). Collaborative caching has two
main advantages: first, users are likely to fall into larger anonymity
sets even if the requested content was found in cache. Second, hit
rates for caches will increase as the collaboration would remove re-
dundancy between nearby caches and effectively simulate a cache
that is much bigger in capacity. Due to this second property, there
may be some economic incentive to deploy this solution besides
protecting user privacy as well [72].
Probabilistic caching. Introducing randomness in the caching pro-
cedure may impact the accuracy of attacks. One possible approach
could be probabilistic caching [64], where a router decides to cache
content based on his position on the forwarding path as well as the
available space in the cache. Since this decision is based on internal
states of routers, it would not be known to an adversary. However,
not caching a random subset of content can provide only a very
limited privacy protection as the cached subset would still violate
user privacy.
3.2 Content privacy
Unencrypted communication over IP networks can be spied upon
using Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) [10] by an adversary on the
end-to-end communication path. However, in CON, content pri-
vacy becomes an even more serious threat due to the presence of
persistent memory (caches) within the network.
Monitoring and Censorship: DPI tools are already commonly
used by certain governments or Internet Service Provider (ISP)
for classifying and censoring content (e.g., based on keywords).
However, DPI on IP networks requires powerful adversaries that
are strategically located on the main communication path and with
enough computation power to perform DPI on line speed. As CON
stores data packets for long time and makes it available to anyone
that asks for it, neither of these assumptions about the adversary
holds. In fact, the adversary might retrieve content from caches for
DPI based monitoring, classification and censorship.
Potential Solutions
As the problem is caused by the lack of data confidentiality, en-
cryption would be the de-facto solution. Naturally, the encryption
mechanism should provide the best balance between security and
efficiency. Also, it should be preserving the benefits of caching
mechanism.
Symmetric/Asymmetric encryption. A trivial approach might be
to use similar mechanisms to SSL/TLS, where a client generates
a session key and encrypts it using the producer public key. After
receiving this key, the producer use it to encrypt the content and
send it back to the user. The main consequence of such approach
is disabling caching mechanism as only one user can decrypt the
content.
Broadcast encryption [38, 12] allows a “broadcaster” to send an
encrypted message to a set of receivers n, each of which has a dif-
ferent private key. Given any subset of n, the broadcaster can con-
struct an encrypted message so that only the receivers in the subset
can decrypt it. Using broadcast encryption to guarantee confiden-
tiality in CON presents several advantages. First, the publisher of a
content can encrypt it only once, for a known subset of users. Also,
the publisher can precompute and store, or generate new decryp-
tion keys on the fly, for already published content. Further, since
encrypted content can be consumed by many users, the benefit from
caching can be preserved in the network. However, the publisher
should generate and store as many keys as the number of clients
(n). Also, producer’s public key and ciphertexts would be of size
O(
√
n) [12], which may result into a significant communication
overhead.
Proxy re-encryption [11] allows a third-party (called proxy) to
(re)encrypt a ciphertext which has been encrypted for Alice, so
that it can be decrypted by another user, e.g., Bob. The proxy is
considered “semi-trusted” because it does not see the content of
the messages being translated. In the CON scenario, the content
provider could generate a pair of public/private key (PKP /SKP )
for each content object. The content, m, is then encrypted as
ms = ENC(M,SKP ). Whenever a client C (with public/private
key pair PKC /SKC ) retrieves the content ms, it queries the con-
tent publisher to generate a re-encryption key by sending PKC .
C then receives a transformation key PKPC from the publisher
that allows him to re-encrypt content ms so that he can decrypt it
(i.e., DEC(RE−ENC(ms, PKPC), SKC) is the original con-
tent m). This allows the message to be encrypted only once and
lets the producer retain control over the decryption since he can
refuse the delivery of the transformation key. Also, key manage-
ment is simplified as the producer creates transformation keys on
the fly and does not have to store any additional keys besides his
PKP /SKP . The encrypted content is disseminated as ms to all
users and allows them to benefit from nearby caches. However, it
requires both asymmetric encryption and re-encryption (key trans-
formation), which are computationally more expensive than com-
monly used symmetric-key encryption algorithms. Nonetheless, as
the data is encrypted only once, this overhead can be acceptable in
many cases.
Cover files. Arianfar et al. [7] described an algorithm to mix legit-
imate content with so-called “cover files”. The content publisher
selects a cover content to mix with legitimate content. Cover files
are known to both user and the adversary Adv. All files are cut in
equally-sized blocks and padding is used when necessary. For all
k tuples, composed of cover and legitimate blocks, the publisher
computes the exclusive-or and publishes the result. For instance,
if k=2 and given the blocks c1, c2, l1 and l2 (c for cover and l for
legitimate), the publisher computes c1 ⊕ c2, c1 ⊕ l1, c1 ⊕ l2, c2 ⊕
l1, c2 ⊕ l2 and l1 ⊕ l2 and publishes them. Using a secure side
channel, the user retrieves meta information, such as the content
hash and length in blocks, cover blocks and the algorithm for gen-
erating the names of each block. To retrieve the content, the user
requests chunks per name and uses belief propagation or Gaussian
elimination to reconstruct the original file. However, this technique
requires the cooperation of producers who have to generate large
amounts of data and xor them. In fact, as pointed out in [7], the
publisher must produce all the chunks in advance and thus, must
perform O((α + β)k) operations where α represents the number
of legitimate blocks, β the number of cover blocks, and k the pos-
sible number of permutations. Hence, this method incurs several
drawbacks that make it unpractical for real-world use.
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Figure 4: Routing Table using hierarchical bloom filter.
3.3 Name privacy
Name privacy arises from the semantic correlation between
human-readable content name and the content itself. Unlike IP,
where addresses represent hosts in the network and are not seman-
tically correlated with the content, CCNx [60] names the content
itself and routes data based on content names. Unfortunately, such
a property creates an imminent privacy threat as the content names
are not only visible but also expected to be semantically related to
the content itself (e.g., /US/WebMD/AIDS/Symptoms/html). Al-
though this appears similar to an HTTP connection over IP, it is
actually more fundamental in CCNx, as content names cannot be
encrypted like the URLs in HTTPS connections. Unlike CCNx,
some other architectural proposals such as [47, 5] use flat names
that are not human-readable. However, all of these proposals rely
on a Name Resolution Service (NRS) that performs the transla-
tion from human-readable names. Since NRS information is public
and accessible to an adversary, even architectures with non human-
readable names create the same inherent threat, due to the naming
of content pieces.
Potential Solutions
Bloom filters. The main name privacy challenge in CONs is keep-
ing the name private while ensuring accessibility and routability.
A possible solution is to use Bloom filters [15] to identify con-
tent. The resulting architecture would be composed of three main
blocks:
1. A hierarchical bloom filter used as the routing table.
2. A counting bloom filter for each interface used as a PIT table
[77].
3. A hierarchical bloom filter used as the router storage.
Fig. 4 shows an example architecture for a routing table. Rather
than sending the request in the clear for a hierarchically named
content, a client would compute the corresponding hierarchical
bloom filter as HB = (B1, B2, ..., Bn) where Bi is the bloom
filter of name components up to the i-th component. For instance,
when asking for /NYtimes/article/green-econmy, the client com-
putes a bloom filter B1 of /NYtimes/, B2 of /NYtimes/article and
B3 of /NYtimes/article/green-econmy. This scheme would work
on CCNx as follows: a router checks whether the last filter (Bn
since it contains the exact content name) is in its content store, if
so, the content is returned to the customer. If not, the router verifies
whether Bn exists in any PIT table. If a match is found, the count-
ing Bloom filter of the corresponding PIT is updated (add one) and
the interest is dropped since a request has already been forwarded.
Finally, if the interest is not available in the content store nor in any
PIT table, the routing process starts: the router checks for longest
prefix match on its routing table by starting from Bn going all the
way to B1 until it finds a matching routing entry. This approach
would enjoy from the obfuscation of content name resulting from
transforming it into a random looking string of bits. Also, it can
reduce the size needed for storing PIT tables [77], content storage,
and routing table, depending on the parameters for the filters and
the size of the content name domain. However, Bloom filters intro-
duce false positives and periodically require resetting.
3.4 Signature privacy
One of the main goals of CONs is to decouple content from
its location and allow retrieving from nearby caches. In order to
trust fetched data, some CON architectures, such as, CCNx [60],
use digital signatures to provide guarantees on provenance and in-
tegrity. Although signatures are powerful tools that bind content
to its producer, ordinary digital signatures may leak sensitive iden-
tity information about the signer.2 This is problematic, especially
when considering censorship and monitoring, as content from cer-
tain publishers can be easily and conveniently identified from the
signing key, which is explicitly stated at every data packet in CCNx.
Potential Solutions
Confirmer signatures. A first approach to prevent an adver-
sary from verifying a signature would be to use confirmer signa-
tures. Confirmer signatures are undeniable signatures [20] where
the signer delegates the verification to a third party (the confirmer),
thus, signatures cannot be verified without interacting with this
party. Using this method, multiple producers may delegate the ver-
ification to a third party and increase the anonymity set for pub-
lishers. Although this method would be easy to implement [20, 40]
and would not require any modification to the CCNx schema, it re-
quires a third party as a confirmer and introduces an another round
of communication for signature verification.
Group signatures [21] allow the signer to hide in a set of potential
signers, thus, providing signer-ambiguity. As such, the client can
verify that the signature was generated by a member of the group
but is unable to tell whom. For instance, a company with multiple
employees may use a group signature so that a signature cannot
be publicly tracked back to a single user but only to the company.
Group signature is efficient since the size of the signature does not
depend on the size of the group. However, it assumes the presence
of a trusted group manager admitting group members, distributing
keys, and revoking anonymity within the group, thus, making it
appropriate only in limited settings with collaborating users.
Ring signatures [66]. As cooperation between users is not al-
ways achievable, ring signatures [66] simplify group signatures by
removing both group manager and members interaction. There-
fore, there is no need to prearrange group of users, nor for special
procedures for group management and key distribution. Also, the
anonymity of the actual signer is always protected. For instance, a
company X could collect the public keys of n other trusted com-
panies Y1, Y2, ..., Yn, as these keys are publicly available. Then,
X can generate a signature σ for content m that keeps the signer
unidentifiable among X and other trusted companies. When a
client fetches a content m, he is able to verify that the content
was produced by one of {X}⋃{Y1, Y2, ..., Yn} without knowing
which one it is. This schema allows customers to trust content as
long as all possible signers are trustworthy, while making anyone
observing their traffic unable to singularly discern the signer. How-
ever, the communication overhead introduced by ring signatures is
linear in the size of the ring. Also, it would still be possible to en-
force censorship based on signatures by blocking all content that
2CCNx currently offers two choices, RSA and ECDSA, as signature algorithms.
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list certain entities as one of potential signers.
Ephemeral identities. Any content producer can create ephemeral
keys to sign content. This would effectively prevent identifying
the publisher of content by looking at its signature. However, this
would also prevent customers from verifying the source/publisher
of a content without an additional mechanism to authenticate it.
Luckily, CCNx allows creating unforgeable links by including
the hash of a content object in the link and allows these links
to be signed. This would allow publishing content signed with
ephemeral keys that are not traceable to a long-lived identity,
but would still allow users to establish transitive trust when they
fetched it, by following link that is published by a trusted party.
For instance, a link to a sensitive content might be published and
signed by a trusted blog (ms) but the actual content (ma) might
be published and signed with a one-time indentity and be served
through an anonymous hosting service (e.g., rapidshare.com). Any
user trusting the blog author can trust ms, and thus (ma), but an
eavesdropper observingma is unable to link it to its publisher. This
approach is very easy to deploy and does not need any modification
of the current architecture, however, it cannot hide the access to the
link and prevent leakage through its signature.
4. THE POTENTIAL OF CON PRIVACY
As the amount and the sensitivity of personal information dis-
seminated on the Web increase, so might related privacy concerns:
according to the Pew Internet & American Life Project, Internet
privacy is actually a growing concern among Americans [62], and
especially in the mobile environment [63].
In this section, we compare CON to today’s Internet in the con-
text of a few privacy concepts, such as, anonymity, censoring, trace-
ability, and confidentiality.
4.1 Anonymity
Anonymity on the Internet describes the state of being not iden-
tifiable within a set of subjects – i.e., actions users carry out on
the Web cannot be connected with their offline identities. On-
line anonymity is motivated by a number of factors, as users are
often concerned about harassment, or even threats to their lives,
resulting from online activities, such as, protesting and whistle-
blowing [35].
A few techniques are possible today to provide anonymous com-
munications. One naı¨ve solution is to rely on a trusted anonymiz-
ing proxy relaying traffic while removing identifying information
(such as, IP addresses and cookies) – see, e.g., the Anonymizer
[14] and the Lucent Personalized Web Assistant [9]. However,
this introduces a single point of failure and trust, thus, proxy-
less techniques have been proposed, They are usually classified
based on the application constraints: delay-tolerant (e.g., email and
file-sharing) or low-latency (e.g., web browsing). While both ap-
proaches rely on mix networks, low-latency anonymizing networks
cannot afford traffic delaying and reordering as well as the intro-
duction of decoy traffic due to latency exigence. Tor [33] is the
best-known, and most widely used, low-latency anonymizing tool.
Using onion routing and layered encryption, it builds a multi-hop
circuit, composed of at least three random nodes chosen from a
central directory, from the user to the Web destination.
In CON, proxy-based anonymity could be obtained without the
need for an external entity: CON architectures would actually pro-
vide, natively, the removal (or substitution) of source and destina-
tion addresses. A neighboring CON router could actually be seen
as an anonymizing proxy. In reality, however, a local active adver-
sary could monitor all connectivity (see Section 3.1). Regardless,
the research community has already started investigating whether
or not onion routing-like techniques can be used in CON: a first an-
swer has been provided by ANDa¯NA [31], a Tor-like low-latency
anonymizing tool for CCN [45]. Compared to Tor, it only requires
two hops, thus, it is reportedly 2.3 to 7 times faster than Tor when
downloading small to medium size files. Moreover, since data in
CON is signed, attacks where the adversary hijacks and modifies
server’s answers to de-anonymize user (see, e.g., [53]) would not
be feasible. Moreover, the portability of ANDa¯NA to architectures
other than CCN depends on the routing protocol. For instance,
PSIRP [71] routers do not store any routing information and rely
on a Forwarding Identifier (FI)3 provided by the client to route back
the content, thus, guaranteeing anonymity is very challenging since
the routing protocol itself leaks information. As the FI carries in-
formation about the user, it should be anonymized while ensuring
that data is correctly forwarded. Whereas, in Dona [47] and Net-
Inf [5], the routing protocol is similar to that used in CCN [45],
hence, it is safe to assume that ANDa¯NA [31] can be used on top
of them to provide anonymous communications.
However, due to data encryption used in ANDa¯NA, CON
caching mechanism cannot be fully used. Also, ANDa¯NA inherits
some of Tor weaknesses, e.g., the difficulty of circumventing cen-
sorship while retrieving the directory with all participating nodes.
In fact, while today Tor Bridges are used as an alternative way to
reach the network with alternating results [74, 32], it is not clear
how accomplish this in ANDa¯NA/CON.
Nonetheless, ANDa¯NA is actually more resilient to website fin-
gerprinting [61], i.e., to an attacker using patterns such as, time,
quantity, and direction of traffic to classify traffic despite encryp-
tion and/or tunneling, thanks to caching, at least against tim-
ing. Furthermore, CON is not affected by response hijacking at-
tacks [53], where the adversary can leverage the lack of data au-
thenticity to modify server’s answers (for instance, [53] shows that,
by hijacking answers of BitTorrent tracker, an attacker control-
ling a Tor exit node can successfully de-anonymize users). This
is not possible in CON since content is signed (thus, it cannot be
altered/modified).
4.2 Censorship Resistance
The increasingly important role played by the Web has led many
governments to grow their attention in monitoring and censoring
Internet traffic. Terms like “Internet censorship” are used to de-
note control and suppression of the access to, or the publishing of,
information on the Internet.
A number of techniques are typically employed to filter and/or
block access to certain contents, including DNS tampering, IP
blocking, and keyword filtering, as well as monitoring the usage of
specific protocols. DNS tampering consists in “deregistering” the
targeted domain, thus, making the domain unreachable. Whereas,
IP blocking relies on predefined blacklists including IPs that are
banned, and keyword filtering leverages Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI) to dig into traffic and drop packets containing sensitive key-
words. In today’s Internet, both DNS tampering and IP blocking
can be easily circumvented. The former can be bypassed by us-
ing public DNS server (e.g., OpenDNS and DNSCrypt [58]) as the
main resolver rather than using the default ISP’s DNS. The lat-
ter can also be circumvented using a proxy. DPI-based filtering
is harder to counter and is used increasingly often – see, e.g., the
deployment of China’s Great Firewall (GFC) [28, 74].
Unfortunately, Internet censorship appears to be easier in CON
architectures. First, and foremost, naming content facilitates key-
word filtering. Then, as CON routers have bigger computational
3FI is a Bloom filter-based technique used by routers to select the forwarding interface.
7
and memory resources, content blocking could be carried more ef-
fectively, without the need for (expensive) dedicated hardware. Fi-
nally, data-monitoring is easier since both interests and data are not
encrypted. Therefore, an attacker only needs to modify the routing
protocol so that any “unwanted” interest is dropped. Content can be
censored independently of its provider and selectively, following a
fine-grained censorship approach.
Also, note that DPI techniques can be stateful (i.e., keeping track
of the network connections) and, as such, they require a signif-
icant amount of memory and processing resource. This require-
ment impacts filtering capabilities for “busy” Internet traffic. For
instance, the work in [27] shows that censored Internet traffic in
China has diurnal patterns: filtering becomes less effective and lets
more than one fourth of the offending packets through during the
busy Internet traffic periods. By contrast, CON, which adopts the
publish/subscribe paradigm, makes the decision to censor content
based either on the interest request or on received data, without
requiring any external information.
However, if CON traffic is exchanged using ANDa¯NA [31],
there would be a couple of features making it harder for the attacker
to censor content. First, both interests and content are encrypted,
and, second, as the exit node is usually out of the attacker’s control,
the latter cannot delete content. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of
ANDa¯NA (or other techniques in CON) to counter Internet censor-
ship remain an open question that calls for further research.
4.3 Untraceability
Internet users today are often tracked and profiled. Large
amounts of data, corresponding to several different events, are be-
ing collected and mined, so that this knowledge can be used to
provide personalized services and behavioral advertising. At the
same time, privacy advocates have labeled this practice as privacy-
invasive, since it allows companies and providers to build detailed
user profiles including personal and sensitive attributes, such as,
sexual orientation, medical conditions, etc.4
Today, a number of techniques are employed to track users, the
most widespread of which are cookies. While it seems straightfor-
ward to port cookies to CON, this is not without obstacles. In fact,
while in current architectures browsers automatically send cookies
to Web servers when fetching data, following so-called same-origin
policy, it is not clear how cookies will be implemented for static
content in CON, since data can be fetched from anywhere. Cook-
ies could be transmitted to the source only when fetching dynamic
data and, as such, cookie-based tracking mechanisms in CON will
be less aggressive as only dynamic content can be tracked. Sim-
ilar arguments apply for Javascript-based tracking, Supercookies,
and Evercookies. Observe that protective measures against profil-
ing are widely available and can be used both with today’s Inter-
net and, in the future, in CON. For instance, a few browser add-
ons, such as Ghostery [36] and DoNotTrack [55] could prevent the
browser from sending cookies. However, more aggressive tracking
techniques have recently emerged. For instance, Stateless track-
ing uses both user IP address and browser fingerprint to uniquely
track users on the web [76]. Mitigating browser fingerprinting can
be achieved by using plug-ins, e.g., NoScripts, however, it is still
hard to hide user’s IP address, unless using techniques for anony-
mous communications. However, as CON architectures remove,
by design, both parties’ identifiers (i.e., source and destination ad-
dresses), it would be harder to actually implement IP-based track-
ing. The lack of traceability might improve user privacy, however,
it naturally raises both security and economic challenges. The for-
4See, for instance, a recent incident where targeted advertisement led to the disclosure
of a pregnancy otherwise kept hidden [44].
mer are related to the lack of source address: for instance, follow-
ing a security incident (e.g. DoS attacks), this information is often
crucial to identify/counter the attacker. Also, removing source ad-
dresses may thwart security solutions used in firewalls and IDS/IPS
tools: e.g., a simple method used today to avoid brute-forcing pass-
word guessing attack is to blacklist a host (based on its IP) after
a few wrong attempts. Whereas, economic challenges stem from
changes that CON might impose on the advertisement model: ads
are usually delivered based on website popularity and user location
and estimating website popularity based on the number of visits is
ineffective in CON as caching will “hide” a significant amount of
traffic.
Finally, observe that, as discussed in Section 3, a few CON net-
work components can actually be used to better track users. Specif-
ically, neighboring routers have a significant role in protecting user
privacy: if compromised or misused, they can severely endanger
it. For instance, a router might collect content, content names, or
content signatures to track users’ navigation and build accurate pro-
files.
4.4 Data authenticity and confidentiality
One of the main CON’s “selling points” is that security is built
into the data itself, by enforcing content signature. Therefore, in-
tegrity, provenance, and trustworthiness of content become built-in
features. As keys can be treated as named CON data, key distri-
bution does not constitute a major issue. While today’s Internet
requires a “one-size-fits-all” trust model, trust in CON is end-to-
end, between data producer and data consumer, and does not de-
pend on any physical or temporal frame. This modularity has two
main advantages. (1) Different consumers may easily implement
different levels of security, and (2) on CON, one can employ both
widely accepted and new trust management models as data is in-
dependent from the deployed model. However, these features also
prompt some challenges. First, we need to identify a set of usable
trust mechanisms that can be deployed and used by most users.
Second, as all content is signed, it is crucial to assess (and po-
tentially improve) efficiency of signature generation, transmission,
verification, and possibly storage. Note that encryption in CON is
not applied to publicly available content, thus, creating problems
related to data confidentiality. One main disadvantage of current
approaches to data encryption (e.g., TLS) is that it inhibits caching,
thus, defeating one of the major advantages to improve network
performance. TLS seems to be in contradiction with the CON de-
sign as: (1) trust is linked to a session and not to the content itself,
and (2) only one user can decrypt content, thus, inhibiting caching
mechanism. However, as discussed in Section 3.2, solutions like
proxy re-encryption might mitigate this issue.
As a result, we believe that providing data confidentiality while
keeping caching mechanism is one of the major open challenges in
CON. Although we have proposed several countermeasures, most
of these rely on public key cryptography, so real-world perfor-
mance overhead imposed on both clients and servers needs to be
thoroughly evaluated.
5. RELATED WORK
Propelled by the increasing interest for next-generation Inter-
net architectures and, in particular, Content-Oriented Networking
(CON), the research community has produced a large body of work
dealing with CON building blocks [45, 47, 71, 5, 43], perfor-
mance [77, 67, 23, 64], and scalability [68, 13]. However, the quest
for analyzing and enhancing security in CON is only at the begin-
ning – in particular, very little work has focused on privacy and
anonymity. In this section, we review relevant prior work.
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Security in CON. Wong and Nikander [75] address security of
naming mechanisms by constructing content name as the concate-
nation of content provider’s ID, cryptographic ID of the content and
some meta-data. Dannewitz et al. [29] adopt a similar approach
where content name is defined as the concatenation of the hash of
the public key and a set of attributes. Both schemes rely on cryp-
tographic hash functions to name the content, which results in a
human-unreadable flat naming. Smetters et al. [70] show that these
schemes have several drawbacks, including the need for an indirec-
tion mechanism to map and the lack of binding between name and
producer’s identity. To resolve these shortcomings, they propose to
keep hierarchical human readable names while signing both con-
tent name and the content itself, using producer’s public key. Gasti
et al. [41] study DoS and DDOS in CCN [45] by presenting attacks
and proposing some initial countermeasures. In another context,
Burke et al. [16] propose a secure lighting systems over Named-
Data Networking (NDN), providing control access to fixtures via
authorization policies, coupled with strong authentication. This ap-
proach is a first attempt to port CON out of the content distribution
scenario.
Privacy Issues in CON. To the best of our knowledge, the only
related privacy study is the recent article by Lauinger et al. in [50,
51], that covers security and privacy issues of CCN [45]. Specifi-
cally, they highlight a few Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerabilities
as well as different cache-related attacks. In CCN, a possible
DoS attack (also discussed in [45]) relies on resource exhaustion,
targeting either routers or content source. Routers are forced to per-
form expensive computation, such as, signature verification, which
negatively affects the quality of service and can ultimately block
traffic. Content source can also be flooded with a huge number
of interests, ending up denying service to legitimate users. Ad-
ditional DoS attacks mainly target the cache mechanism, to either
decrease network performance or to gain free and uncontrolled stor-
age. Transforming the cache into a permanent storage is achieved
by continuously issuing interests for a desired file. Decreased net-
work performance can also be achieved through cache pollution.
From the privacy perspective, work in [50, 51] identifies the is-
sue of information leakage through caches in CCN. It proposes a
few simple countermeasures, following detection and prevention
approaches. The former can be achieved using techniques similar
to those addressing cache pollution attacks in IP [30], although such
an approach can be difficult to port to CON due to the lack of source
address. The latter can actually be global, i.e., treating all traffic as
sensitive, delaying all traffic, or deploying a shared cache to cir-
cumvent the attack. Alternatively, a selective prevention approach
may try to distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive content,
based on content popularity and context (time, location), and then
delay or tunnel sensitive content. It is not clear, however, how to
implement the selection mechanism to distinguish between private
and non-private content, but authors of [51] suggest to implement
this service either in the network layer (i.e., the router classifies
the content) or by the host (i.e., content source tags sensitive con-
tent). Such classification is in turn a very challenging task, since
privacy is a relative notion that changes from one user to another.
Also, censorship and surveillance are briefly discussed, although
no countermeasures besides tunneling have been proposed.
Our work extends that in [50, 51] by encompassing all privacy
aspects: caching, naming, signature, and content. Also, it is more
general as it does not only consider CCN [45], but CON in general,
independently of the specific instantiation. Furthermore, when sug-
gesting countermeasures, we only propose techniques that can be
applied with a minimal change to the architecture.
Anonymity in CON. ANDa¯NA [31] proposes a Tor-like
anonymizing tool for CCN [45] to provide provable anonymity. It
also aims to privacy protection via simple tunneling. However, as
discussed in Section 4.1, ANDa¯NA is an “all-in-one” solution that
introduces latency and impedes caching. Whereas, fine-grained
privacy solutions are needed, since a widespread use of tunneling
would inherently take away most of CON benefits in terms of per-
formance and scalability. To provide censorship resistance, Ari-
anfar et al. [7] describes an algorithm to mix legitimate sensitive
content with so-called “cover files” to hide it. By monitoring the
content, an adversary would only see the “mixed” content, which
prevents him from censoring the content.
6. CONCLUSION
Content-Oriented Networking (CON) proposes a major transi-
tion from today’s Internet to a new content-based architecture. This
radical change calls for a thorough analysis of both security and
privacy guarantees. CON comes with a potential benefit to secu-
rity, including a security-by-design approach based on digital sig-
natures that provides data integrity and origin authentication, as
well as trust support. However, prior to our work, it remained an
open question whether or not, and to what extent, this emerging
networking paradigm bears new privacy threats.
This paper presented a first-of-its-kind, systematic analysis of
privacy issues in CON as a generic paradigm, discussing different
attacks and detailing their impact on user privacy. We also proposed
several countermeasures while attempting to balance the trade-off
between privacy, performance, and changes to the architecture. In
the process, we identified a number of interesting research chal-
lenges that call for further work in the area.
Naturally, our work does not end here: first, and foremost, we
are working toward further evaluating the feasibility of our pro-
posed countermeasures and their effective deployment; next, we
plan to provide an in-depth study of multiple encryption and signa-
ture techniques and their impact on network performance; finally,
we intend to analyze the impact of privacy-enhancing and CON-
native technologies on Web economy and advertisement models.
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